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A B S T R A C T
Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) are widespread in conservation policy. In PES, environmental effec-
tiveness and social equity are often perceived as conflicting goals. Empirical studies on the relationship between
popular design features, such as payment differentiation and payment conditionality, and effectiveness and
equity are scarce. Further, they struggle with measuring and separating ecological and equity outcomes. In this
study, we combine two incentivized lab-in-the-field experiments with 259 land users from eight villages in
North-Western Vietnam to assess both individual conservation effort and community-level equity perceptions
under four different PES designs. Effort is measured in a real-effort task with real-world environmental benefits;
equity perceptions about payment designs in the real-effort task are measured in a coordination game. We
demonstrate that payment design affects both effort and equity perceptions. Payments which are differentiated
and are solely conditional on individuals’ contributions of effort are perceived as most equitable. They are also
more effective in motivating conservation effort than other designs, although the differences are small and not
significant for all comparisons. By working out the positive correlation of effectiveness and equity across the four
payment schemes, we show that these objectives are not necessarily conflicting goals in incentive-based con-
servation policy. Further, we can show that women exert greater conservation efforts. We discuss how greater
equity and effectiveness could be achieved with reforms towards more input-based distribution criteria in
Vietnam’s PES legislation and the limitations and opportunities of the experimental paradigm for research on
PES.
1. Introduction
Global efforts for the conservation of biodiversity and ecosystem
services, such as carbon sequestration and storage or water filtration,
call for a diverse set of policy interventions at various governance le-
vels. Over the past years, incentive-based approaches such as Payments
for Ecosystem Services (PES) have developed into a widespread con-
servation policy instrument (Muradian et al., 2010; Sattler and
Matzdorf, 2013; Schomers and Matzdorf, 2013; Vatn, 2015; Wunder,
2015). Design and implementation of these instruments often en-
compass both, ecological effectiveness and social equity objectives (He
and Sikor, 2015; Law et al., 2018; Loft et al., 2017a; Sills et al., 2017).
In the literature on social equity in conservation initiatives, most stu-
dies report that land and natural resource users suffer from inequitable
procedures or distributions (Friedman et al., 2018). Importantly, equity
may be linked to environmental outcomes in different ways: On the one
hand, achieving both goals simultaneously with a limited budget is
often viewed as a trade-off (Chu et al., 2019; Martin et al., 2014a;
Pascual et al., 2010; Wunder et al., 2018). Thus, given a fixed budget,
equity and environmental effectiveness should be inversely correlated.
On the other hand, it has been argued that equity itself affects effec-
tiveness, with a positive causal effect of fair distributions to effective
conservation (see Bennett, 2016; Law et al., 2018; Pascual et al., 2014).
In this study, we focus on the former type of link. We follow the call that
there is a “need for more research on the potentially important link
between social equity and environmental effectiveness” (Engel, 2016,
p. 138) and assess different designs of incentive-based conservation
policies separately in both dimensions, their effectiveness to induce
conservation effort and their perceived equity.
The concept of equity (fairness, justice) implies much more than
equality. For example, it incorporates whether people are seen as ac-
countable for the conditions they experience or the opportunities they
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have (e.g., instead of having luck or profiting from others’ efforts;
Konow, 2003). Equity in PES is often defined along four dimensions:
context as the acknowledgment of local conditions; procedure as the
participation in implementation; recognition as the respect for all sta-
keholders’ knowledge and values; and distribution in terms of costs and
benefits occurring to different stakeholders (Brown and Corbera, 2003;
Corbera et al., 2007; Friedman et al., 2018; Martin et al., 2014a, 2014b;
McDermott et al., 2013; Pascual et al., 2010, 2014). In particular, the
latter has been the focus of much debate, because the perception of
what constitutes a fair distribution of the costs and benefits of con-
servation among local program participants differs within and between
communities and stakeholder groups (e.g., Hayes and Murtinho, 2018;
He and Sikor, 2015; Loft et al., 2017b; Narloch et al., 2013). This can
lead to contradictory conclusions about which benefit distribution is
fair. Indeed, Myers et al. (2018) identify benefit sharing and its align-
ment with local notions of justice as a primary source of conflict in PES
policies. To navigate the potential trade-off between benefit sharing
and environmental effectiveness in PES, various design features of PES
schemes have been discussed. Fundamental design questions are whe-
ther and how payments should be differentiated between program
participants and to which extent they should be conditional on per-
formance (Engel, 2016; Luttrell et al., 2013; McDermott et al., 2013;
Pascual et al., 2010; Wunder et al., 2018). PES programs may pay fixed
rates to local ecosystem service providers or adjust payments by dif-
ferent factors. Payments could, for example, be adjusted relative to ES
providers’ costs (e.g., their opportunity costs of refraining from resource
extraction, i.e., “compensation”) or the actual provision of ES (i.e., the
degree of ecological improvement caused by the intervention). Im-
portantly, the details of these design features can affect ecological and
social outcomes of PES (Ezzine-de-Blas et al., 2016; Wunder et al.,
2018). While it is broadly acknowledged that differentiation and con-
ditionality influence social and ecological outcomes of PES policies,
there have been few attempts to disentangle the equity and effective-
ness consequences of contract design features (Calvet-Mir et al., 2015;
Halpern et al., 2013; Pascual et al., 2010). This is probably partially due
to the challenge of cleanly measuring and causally attributing equity
and effectiveness outcomes in case studies and observational research.
In this study, accordingly, we explore environmental effectiveness
(research question 1) and social equity perceptions (research question
2) of different payment contracts separately by using economic ex-
periments with a population of PES recipients in North-Western
Vietnam. In particular, we investigate undifferentiated egalitarian
payments, payments conditional on individual costs and efforts, and
payments conditional on actual provision. We also investigate pay-
ments that differentiate between recipients, but that do so randomly
and without being conditional on salient outcome measures. By sub-
sequently aggregating the separate results on social equity and en-
vironmental effectiveness from two related experiments, we will thus
also have an empirical basis to comment on the potential trade-off
between both outcome dimensions (research question 3), as proposed
in the literature (Chu et al., 2019; Law et al., 2018; Narloch et al., 2013;
Wunder et al., 2018). We introduce a novel combination of economic
lab-in-the-field experiments. In line with the calls for more inter-
disciplinary research on justice in conservation policies (Friedman
et al., 2018) and more evidence-based analyses of equity in PES (Calvet-
Mir et al., 2015; Martin et al., 2014a; Pascual et al., 2010, 2014; Vatn,
2010), we implement paradigms from experimental and behavioral
economics with forest resource users in the field. This gives us the
opportunity to compare different PES benefit sharing schemes in the
same population, instead of comparing case study reports which differ
over many contextual factors. We can draw on a large research tradition
in economics that links fairness considerations or social norms to eco-
nomic behavior (e.g., Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt,
1999; Krupka and Weber, 2013).
Our study, thus, augments the growing literature on lab-in-the-field
experiments on the effectiveness of PES (Andersson et al., 2018; Gatiso
et al., 2018; Handberg and Angelsen, 2019; Narloch et al., 2012;
Reutemann et al., 2016; Salk et al., 2017) and builds on the premise
that experimental economics is well-suited to analyse effects of in-
stitutions and policies on pro-environmental behavior (Rommel, 2015).
In the next section, we introduce the study site and population as
well as the current PES regime in the area. Then, we turn to our ex-
perimental methods. After reporting experimental results, we close with
a discussion.
2. Local background
In this section, the national and regional background on payments
for forest conservation in Vietnam are explained in more detail (2.1)
with further elaborations on the current benefit sharing rules of the
scheme (2.2).
2.1. National and regional context
A variety of PES definitions and typologies exist. A core element of
most PES definitions is the provision of positive economic incentives
conditional upon the supply of well-defined ecosystem services (or ac-
tivities thought to yield well-defined ecosystem services) (Muradian
et al., 2010; Schomers and Matzdorf, 2013; Wunder, 2015, 2005). In
Vietnam, the national Payments for Forest Ecosystem Services scheme
(PFES) was piloted between 2008 and 2010 and has been implemented
nationwide since 2011 (McElwee et al., 2014). PFES targets four broad
categories of ecosystem services provided to different non-govern-
mental ecosystem services buyers: (1) watershed protection; (2) pro-
tection of natural landscape beauty and conservation of forest biodi-
versity; (3) forest carbon sequestration and retention; (4) provision of
spawning grounds and use of water from forests for aquaculture. In
contrast to some definitions of PES (e.g. Wunder, 2005, 2015), PFES
participation of ecosystem service providers and users is mandatory by
law. Currently, hydropower plants and water supply companies are the
main buyers of ecosystem services. Their payments are delivered to
government agencies and then disbursed to ecosystem services provi-
ders, i.e., land users. Contrary to some other PES schemes, land users
are not paid for the outcome in terms of provided ecosystem services.
Instead, they are financially compensated for undertaking active forest
protection, such as firefighting and organizing “forest protection
groups”. Among the main beneficiaries of PFES payments are house-
holds and communities with rights to forest land. Currently, on the
national level, 355,000 households and community groups, managing
3.5 million hectares of forest (25% of total forest area in the country),
receive PFES payments (Vietnam Forest Protection and Development
Fund (VNFF), 2015). In our study province of Dien Bien in North-
Western Vietnam (Fig. 1), large parts of the forests are managed by
individuals, households, and communities. In Dien Bien, 12 million
USD of PFES revenues had been collected from buyers since 2011, of
which 5 million USD had been distributed to villagers as providers of
ecosystem services at the time of data collection.
We selected eight villages (Fig. 1) of three different ethnicities
(Thai, Hmong, Khang) that were part of an earlier study which analysed
the consideration of equity in the design and implementation of PFES in
Vietnam (Loft et al., 2017b; Supplementary material, Table S1). This
allowed us to conduct the experimental study with a solid under-
standing of the local context. Originally, the villages had been selected
by the researchers based on representativeness of the social, political,
and economic characteristics of the region (e.g., ethnic diversity, pov-
erty). The villages are also well-suited for our research questions on
design features of payment differentiation and conditionality: Loft et al.
(2017b) showed that, in these villages, perceptions of distributional
equity in PFES are mainly oriented along the concepts of egalitarianism
(equal payments) and compensation (merit-based payments), while
alternative design features like needs-based (pro-poor payments) or
status-based approaches play only a small role.
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2.2. Current payment scheme
Under PFES, the size of payments to land use rights holders is de-
termined by a sequence of formulae, laid out in Vietnam’s national
legislation. The net revenues of payments collected from watershed
service buyers are disbursed to ecosystem services providers. So-called
“K-coefficients” are being applied to differentiate payments based on
forest quality, classification, and accessibility. K1 differentiates forest
condition (rich, medium, or poor); K2: forest function (special-use,
protection, or production forest); K3: origin of the forest (natural or
plantation); and K4: level of difficulty of forest protection (considering
social and geographic factors). The purpose of these K-coefficients is to
reward “who is doing the best job in providing the ecosystem services”
and to ensure that “those who keep the forest well, deserve high pay-
ments” (personal communication, VNFF). K1–3 are indicators for the
quality of the forest, used as a proxy for the provision of ecosystem
services. Theoretically, the application of K1–3 allows for a differ-
entiation of payments based on the result of forest protection. Thus,
they reflect a distribution that rewards the output or “actual provision”
of ecosystem services. The application of K4 allows for a differentiation
of payments according to the difficulty of forest protection based on
social and geographic factors. It thereby takes into account the com-
pensation of work effort of ecosystem services providers. For example,
if the forest areas to be protected are distant from a settlement area, the
level of payment should be adjusted to compensate for time and
transportation costs. Thus, K4 is a merit-based distribution that com-
pensates those who put the most work into forest protection. However,
the application of these K-coefficients is currently often suspended in
practice due to their vague definition, administrative capacity con-
straints, high transaction costs, and a lack of guidelines and indicators
for implementation. Due to the practical simplicity in implementation,
equal payments are often being distributed (Loft et al., 2017b; Pham
et al., 2013). Our results on social and ecological consequences of dif-
ferent payment design features in a PFES-targeted population hence
will also speak to the discourse of payment design and implementation
in the area.
3. Methods
Our study consisted of two lab-in-the-field experiments, both of
which were conducted in each of the eight study villages (see
Supplementary material, Table S1 for characteristics of villages and
sessions). Note that all data and code are available for a full re-
production of all results and figures presented in this paper in the Code
Ocean capsule https://codeocean.com/capsule/1108125.
The first experiment (Experiment 1) was a real-effort task on the
impact of different payment schemes on actual conservation effort, i.e.,
environmental effectiveness (Table 1). Conservation effort was mea-
sured as performance in the real-effort task in which real public goods
for forest conservation were produced. In addition, we conducted a
coordination game to elicit “equity scores” as a community-level mea-
sure of perceived fairness for each of the four payment schemes (Ex-
periment 2). Each experiment used a different group of subjects from
the same village, i.e., subjects could participate in only one of the ex-
periments, and we ensured separation to prevent communication. We
analyze effectiveness in Experiment 1 (Research question 1) and equity
in Experiment 2 (Research question 2) separately, before looking at
their association (Research question 3; see Fig. 2).
Although we informed village heads about our study and received
their consent, participants were unaware of the details of the planned
Fig. 1. Study area. Within each research site (green), two villages took part in the study (for interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader
is referred to the web version of this article).
L. Loft, et al. Land Use Policy 86 (2019) 218–228
220
experiments to prevent strategic communication prior to implementa-
tion. To limit cross-communication among participants, for each ex-
periment we conducted only one session in a given village. We ensured
that participants of the two experiments did not communicate verbally
during a session.1 In total, 259 subjects participated in the experiments
(176 in Experiment 12, and 83 in Experiment 2), of which 139 (54%)
were female. Sampling of participants within villages was initiated via a
public announcement, with subsequent randomization of people who
showed interest into participation (yes or no) and experiment (1 or 2).
Note that due to our rather small sample sizes, our design allows us to
detect only medium-sized and large effects at conventional levels of
alpha= 5% and beta= 20%.
Instructions were given in Vietnamese, and, if applicable, in the
local language. Subjects were free to leave at any time, all decisions
were made in private, payment distribution followed a double-blind
process, and there was no deception in the experiments. The show-up
fee was 2.19 USD, which approximates a daily wage in the region. On
top of that, subjects earned on average 2.11 USD (SD=0.73 USD) in
Experiment 1 (90min) and 1.00 USD (SD=0.39 USD) in Experiment 2
(45min).3 After completion of the task and before payments, subjects
took part in a brief survey on socio-demographics, conservation
behavior and experiment-related controls. We gathered all participants
for a debriefing after the experiments, in which we explained the study
purpose. There was time to discuss the experiment with the researchers
and to ask questions about the study.
3.1. Experiment 1: the real-effort task
In this section, the design of the real-effort task (3.1.1), its different
payment treatments (3.1.2), and the experimental procedure in the field
(3.1.3) are explained.
3.1.1. Task design
As common in experimental economic research on the role of in-
centives (Charness et al., 2018), we used a real-effort experiment to
determine environmental effectiveness under different payment
schemes. Environmental effectiveness was measured as conservation
effort in the task. The task required physical effort and produced real-
world environmental benefits, which distinguishes it from abstract pen-
and-paper experiments on PES in which subjects invest in or harvest
hypothetical resources and where their payoffs are exclusively non-
environmental (e.g., Andersson et al., 2018; Handberg and Angelsen,
2019; Narloch et al., 2012). Real-effort tasks can add validity to ex-
perimental research concerned with behavior in a particular applied
context (Charness et al., 2018), and they have recently become popular
in conservation research with natural resource users in the field (Jindal
et al., 2017; Nelson et al., 2018).
Lab-in-the-field experiments that produce real-world public goods
are still only scarcely employed (but see Gatiso et al., 2018 for ex-
periments that fund schools), in particular in combination with real-
effort tasks (Kerr et al., 2012). Consequently, we provide the first ex-
perimental study on PES which encompasses real effort of real resource
users and real environmental benefits.
In the present task, subjects had 45min to fill small degradable
Table 1
Treatments in the real-effort task.
Treatment Reference in the PES literature Payoff function Sample size
Merit input (differentiated, conditional
payment)
Distribution should be proportional or relative to the contribution of the stakeholders. The
distribution compensates costs and input such as work effort (Pascual et al., 2010; Sattler and
Matzdorf, 2013)
Pi= xi * A (piece
rate)
43
Merit output (differentiated, conditional
payment)
Distribution rewards output, such as monitored change in the provision of ES (“actual
provision”) (Pascual et al., 2010; Sattler and Matzdorf, 2013).
Pi= xi * A+5 * A
(piece rate)
44
Fixed equal (undifferentiated, unconditional
payment)
Distribution is equal among all providers of a service independent of the cost and level of
service provision (Pascual et al., 2010).
Pi= B (flat rate) 42
Fixed individual (differentiated, unconditional
payment)
Distribution is differentiated, but without salient justifiable criteria. For example, payment
distribution via auctions might get perceived as random allocation by people who lack
understanding of the auction mechanism (Leimona and Carrasco, 2017).
Pi= Ci (flat rate) 44
Fig. 2. Empirical strategy and research questions. Differently colored contracts represent different payment schemes that vary in their design features with respect to
payment differentiation and conditionality. Experiment 1 focused on ecosystem service provision conditional on contract design (real-effort task). Experiment 2
focused on beliefs about the social appropriateness of the different contract designs (coordination game).
1 In both experiments, subjects were encouraged not to talk and indeed did
not talk, aside from occasional laughter or moaning (as reported by local as-
sistants and the Vietnamese co-author who was part of the field research team).
In Experiment 2, subjects were seated in a way that they could not observe
others’ decisions.
2 We excluded three subjects of Experiment 1 from the analysis, as we could
not rule out that they had listened to the instructions or talked to participants of
the other experiment. This resulted in 173 subjects for our analysis of
Experiment 1 and 256 in total.
3 All payments were made in Vietnamese Dong. For better readability, we
report all monetary values in US Dollar. At the time of the study 10,000 Dong
were equal to 0.44 US Dollar (1 USD = 22,800 Dong).
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plastic bags (3 x 9 cm) with nutritious soil (see Fig. 3 for setup). The
performance in the task was easy to measure (number of bags pro-
duced) and could be observed under different payment schemes, as
reflected in our treatments (Table 1). Note that such soil bags are
commonly used by conservation NGOs in the region. Just as in our task,
organizations pay people for filling these soil bags which are later used
for afforestation (Supplementary material). We informed subjects prior
to the task that all bags they produce would be used for afforestation in
the region; they were collected by forest officials immediately after the
task. Hence, subjects knew that they were producing a real-world en-
vironmental public good and real environmental concerns should
therefore affect behavior in the task, besides any payments.4 This adds
an important layer of realism to the experiments, which is absent in lab-
in-the-field experiments purely based on social dilemma games. In such
games, researchers measure cooperation which does not necessarily
equal pro-environmental behavior (Gehrig et al., 2019; Torres-Guevara
and Schlüter, 2016). Contrary to these games, the social dilemma does
not arise in small groups within the game, but on the level of the real-
world conservation public good (here, forests). The task had additional
desirable features that would reflect real-world conservation activities:
it was tedious and repetitive, but it did not require any special skills
that could vary strongly among subjects (we also asked and controlled
for previous experience in a survey question). As part of PFES policies,
people in our study population must also actively engage in effort for
forest protection, amongst others through monitoring and reporting
illegal logging activities and firefighting (Loft et al., 2017b; Pham et al.,
2013). Also in other instances, for example in the Sloping Land Con-
version Program in China (He and Sikor, 2015), active afforestation is a
fundamental part of PES schemes. Thus, we argue that an experiment
which measures active effort as our real-effort task (instead of just the
costs of foregone benefits from resource extraction) is suited for re-
search on PES generally and for the PFES case in particular.
Subjects in real-effort tasks may exert effort because of boredom or a
lack of attractive alternative things to do, i.e., often, there are no op-
portunity costs in an experimental setting and this can affect perfor-
mance (see Eckartz, 2014; Erkal et al., 2018). For example, curiosity for
the task, rather than experimentally controlled incentives (money,
conservation) could affect performance. To reduce such confounding
effects, we offered sweets, snacks, and water to subjects on a table as an
alternative to working (Fig. 3). We removed snacks immediately after
the task, to prevent that subjects would plan to eat and drink after-
wards. This was common knowledge before the start. Snacks had a
value of approximately 5 USD per village. This outside option was ex-
tensively used in all villages but not by all subjects. Several subjects
took breaks for several minutes. Although we have no data on the time
used for consumption per session or individual, we recorded that the
latest initial “snack break” taken in any of the village was after 25min,
and the median initial break was after 15min. This value does not
correlate with mean village-level performance (Supplementary mate-
rial).
3.1.2. Treatments
We randomly assigned participants to four different treatments, i.e.
payment schemes in each village. We defined the treatments based on
commonly discussed PES design features of payment differentiation and
conditionality (Table 1). In the merit input treatment, subjects were paid
solely based on their performance. In the merit output treatment, the
individual containers already contained five soil bags to mimic het-
erogeneity in initial natural resource stocks that cannot be influenced
by forest users themselves, e.g., better initial forest quality or the fre-
quency of poaching by outsiders.5 In the fixed equal payment, all par-
ticipants received the same fixed payment, independent of perfor-
mance. This treatment resembles unconditional egalitarian payments,
i.e., everyone received the same money. In contrast, in the fixed in-
dividual treatment, there was variation in fixed payments on the in-
dividual level.
In Table 1, Pi is the payoff of subject i, and xi the numbers of bags
produced (i.e., performance) of subject i. A, B, and Ci are payment rates,
which were randomly drawn between villages. We were interested in
differences between the type of incentive in the payment schemes, not
the impact of the magnitude of payment rates. We thus randomized the
payment rates:
• A as piece payment rate for the merit input and merit output treat-
ments,• B as flat payment rate for the fixed equal treatment, and• Ci as individual flat payment rate for each subject i in the fixed in-
dividual treatment
Payment rates were generated by determining one of the two
Fig. 3. Real-effort task set-up for the production of soil bags (a. concept, b. example of actual implementation). Subjects were seated in a circle in around the
resources they needed for work (piles of bare soil, surrounded by empty soil bags) and their leisure option (snacks, drinks, buckets for hand washing). Bags had to be
filled with soil. We asked subjects to store all produced bags in a larger individual bag next to each seat. Subjects were free to stop working and move around (except
for leaving the experimental setup), and to consume snacks at any time. They were not allowed to talk. A large watch indicated the remaining time. Sheets, titled A, B
and C, were visible to all participants, and their backsides contained the randomly implemented payment rate for each treatment (see 3.1.2), which were revealed
after the task.
4 This is mirrored in lab research in behavioral economics. If subjects perceive
the tasks as meaningful, they exert greater efforts, independent of monetary
rewards (e.g., Ariely et al., 2008; DellaVigna and Pope, 2018; Kosfeld et al.,
2017). This is relevant for our study, because environmental conservation ef-
forts in particular are often driven by the pursuit of meaning and moral sa-
tisfaction (see Rode et al., 2015).
5 We chose this design for the merit output treatment, because it is easy to
understand and captures the basic idea of external influences on performance.
Alternatively, we could for example have introduced a probabilistic deduction
or addition of bags.
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possible payment rates with a coin flip before the task started but re-
mained hidden behind visible sheets until after the task (Fig. 3) and
should, thus, not affect effort differently between villages6 . Subjects
knew about the two possible outcomes to rule out that they formed
beliefs about extremely high or low wage rates, which could have led to
heterogeneity in beliefs and, subsequently, effort. To control for het-
erogeneity in expectations, we also elicited subjects’ beliefs about their
payment rates before the start of the task.
3.1.3. Procedure
In each village, between 20 and 28 subjects took part in Experiment
1 (Supplementary material, Table S1). Subjects were randomly assigned
to one of the four treatments (Table 1). After a general welcome and
introduction to the task, subjects received treatment-specific written
instructions. Payments were individually and privately disclosed and
explained in written form and with visual and verbal aids (see Sup-
plementary material for instructions). Hence, subjects in Experiment 1
were not aware of other treatments than their own, which was meant to
reduce experimenter demand effects (Zizzo, 2010). To nevertheless
attain that the egalitarian and the differentiated flat rate payments
(fixed equal and fixed individual, respectively) were perceived differently
by subjects we framed all four treatments as group-based: we told
subjects that they were in a group with some other people from their
community who would receive the same instructions and type of pay-
ment as they do. Subjects were explicitly told that it was completely up
to them how much they would work in the 45min which would be
available. They were also informed that the number of produced bags
could not be connected to their names and identity. During the ex-
periment, subjects could observe each other, but they were not allowed
to talk. Although they could freely move, e.g., to wash their hands,
relax, or consume snacks, subjects were not allowed to leave the ex-
perimental setting completely. A large watch was visible to all subjects
and indicated the time. We ensured that subjects did not feel observed
while working, by having only two of the six assistants present during
the experiment (to prevent cheating and talking). The foreign re-
searchers and fellow villagers were not present during the task. After
45min, individual containers were collected, bags were counted, and
subjects took part in a small survey (Supplementary material). Table 2
shows summary statistics for the participants in Experiment 1.
3.2. Experiment 2: the coordination game
In Experiment 2, our goal was to assign an “equity score” to each
treatment and village that would reflect the perceived fairness of the
payment scheme in a community at the time of experimentation.
Experiment 2 was a coordination game. Coordination games are games
in which the payoff of an individual depends on the frequency with
which others choose the same option, but where, once coordinated,
individuals have no reason to change their strategy. Instead of imposed
definitions of equity, we experimentally elicited fairness perceptions
about the four incentive mechanisms (Table 1) in the same community
where the real-effort task was conducted, but with different subjects.
The rationale was that distributional fairness norms may exhibit local
variation, even on the relatively small scale of our study, which in-
cluded three different ethnicities. Thus, we chose a “norm elicitation”
method that allowed equity scores to vary between villages but that
defined them on the village level, rather than the individual level. We
define equity perceptions as a normative judgment and thus a property
of the community that shares social bonds rather than a property of an
individual. To measure norms of equity, we adapted an approach from
the experimental economics literature: Krupka and Weber (2013, p.
499) define social norms as “collective perceptions, among members of
a population, regarding the appropriateness of different behaviours.”
According to their definition, social norms create focal points to en-
hance coordination and cooperation in social interactions. Against this
background, social norms are a “correlation device” to align mutual
expectations about others’ behavior in a community (see also Gintis,
2009). A community-level equity norm should enable people to predict
others’ equity perceptions about certain actions and behaviors. Thus, as
opposed to survey measures which elicit data in isolation, a coordina-
tion game should be an appropriate approach to measure community-
level norms, which, in our case, concerned the fairness of different PES
schemes.
Following Krupka and Weber (2013), subjects had to rate the social
appropriateness of each of the four treatments, i.e. payment schemes on
a four-point scale from “very socially inappropriate” to “very socially
appropriate”. They were asked to picture a scenario in which in-
dividuals would face the real-effort task from Experiment 1 and would
be paid by an organization according to each of the four different
payment schemes. We described appropriateness further as being
“consistent with moral or fair behavior” and as being the “right” thing
to do.
Subjects received a payoff of 0.44 USD (10,000 Dong) for each re-
sponse that would match the modal rating, i.e., the rating that most
others also chose, among all other participants of Experiment 2 in their
village. Hence, subjects had an incentive to state their true beliefs on
what they think the plurality (relative majority) perceives as appro-
priate or fair and hence on what constitutes the shared social equity
norm. Note again that this method does not view social norms as an
aggregate of individuals’ characteristics, but as a collective community
characteristic that emerges through mutual expectations. Each subject
rated each treatment (Table 1), i.e., everybody had to give four re-
sponses. Based on this data, we calculated an equity score for each of
the four payment schemes and each village by a weighted summation of
responses (Supplementary material), closely following the procedure of
Krupka and Weber (2013): the equity score was defined as the sum of
all “very inappropriate,” “somewhat inappropriate,” “somewhat in-
appropriate,” and “very appropriate” ratings multiplied by −1, −1/3,
1/3, and 1, respectively. Thus, an equity score of zero indicates “neu-
tral” appropriateness.
In each village, either ten or eleven subjects took part in Experiment
2. We explained to them the coordination game and the real-effort task,
because their choices were about the appropriateness of the type of
payment that were provided in the latter. All subjects received written
instructions, verbal and visual aids as a group, as well as personal
support if questions remained. After a demonstration and practice
round with an example, subjects rated the four treatments in private
(see Supplementary material for instructions and materials).
4. Results
In this section, we first separately analyze performance in the real-
effort task (4.1) and equity perceptions elicited in the coordination
game (4.2), before combining the results in a joint analysis (4.3).
4.1. Experiment 1: effectiveness
Subjects invested considerable effort into production of soil bags for
afforestation, as indicated by an average of 34.8 produced bags
(SD=13.8, median=33) in the 45min to perform the task. Effort
aggregated over villages was approximately normally distributed
(Supplementary material, Fig. S1). Only two subjects did not produce
any bags within the 45min (both in treatments with unconditional
payments). The maximum number of bags produced was 80 (Fig. 4).
6 The two possible payment rates for piece rate treatments (A) were 1,000 and
1,500 Dong per bag (0.04 and 0.07 USD, respectively). The two possible pay-
ment rates for the flat rate treatments (B and Ci) were 40,000 and 60,000 Dong
(1.75 and 2.63 USD, respectively). Note that the initial endowment with five
bags in merit output can be viewed as an increase in the show-up fee, i.e., an
“unearned” and “undeserved” additional endowment.
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There was large between-village heterogeneity in performance (Sup-
plementary material, Figs. S2, S3), with the mean village performance
ranging from 21.8 to 50.9. As village variation is not our primary in-
terest, we control for village in all subsequent statistical analyses (see
Supplementary material for a short discussion on potential drivers of
between-village heterogeneity). When including village as a predictor,
an overall effect of treatment on performance in the task is indicated
(ANOVA, F3, 162= 2.27, p= 0.082; Fig. 4).
To separate the effect of different treatments, we use treatment
dummy variables in a fixed-effect model with conservation effort (the
number of bags produced) as a dependent variable (Table 3: Model 1;
reference category: fixed individual). There are statistically significant
treatment effects for the two merit-based payment schemes (merit input
and merit output), when compared to the reference category. The effect
of the merit input treatment is larger than the effect of the merit output
treatment, but the two coefficients are not statistically different from
each other. Neither are both different from the coefficient of fixed equal
(p= 0.14 and p=0.26, respectively, for estimates from Model 2 with
switched reference category, see Code Ocean capsule).
In Model 2, we add socio-demographics and task-related survey
variables to the models, as well as one indicator of real-life conservation
behaviour (forest group). There are no issues with multicollinearity
among the added independent variables (all pairwise correlations with
Pearson r < 0.35). The estimated treatment effects do not substantially
change in magnitude, and they maintain their level of statistical sig-
nificance. We can conclude that conditional payments (both, based on
compensation only, and based on actual provision of ES) lead to higher
environmental effectiveness than unconditional, differentiated pay-
ments, while conservation effort under unconditional, undifferentiated
payments (egalitarian payments) lies in-between and is not significantly
different from any of the other treatments.
Turning to effects of individual-level covariates, there is a large
gender effect on performance. Women, on average, produced five bags
more than men. There are no large or statistically significant effects of
other socio-demographics. The same applies to previous experience
with the task, self-reported attractiveness of the snacks, i.e., an estimate
of the magnitude of the individual opportunity costs of working, and
expectations on the payment rate. Further, the proxy for real-world
conservation behaviour, i.e. participation in a forest protection group,
is not associated with conservation effort in the task.
As robustness checks, we fit Model 2 also (1) including the three
subjects we removed because they did not comply with the experi-
mental protocol and (2) excluding outliers, defined as performance
values that were exceeding 1.5 times the interquartile range of the
aggregated outcome data. In both robustness checks, coefficients and
standard errors remained virtually unchanged and p-values remained in
the same intervals (see Code Ocean capsule).
4.2. Experiment 2: equity
In 65.4% of the cases, subjects matched (one of) their village’s
modal response(s) in Experiment 2, i.e., their response was in line with
the plurality. In 81% of the cases, there was only one relative majority/
modal response (i.e., there were no ties). In the other cases, all subjects
who matched with one of the modal responses were paid. Remember
that modal/plurality responses indicate a shared perception of what
constitutes a “socially appropriate” and “fair” payment scheme. The
Table 2
Summary statistics of subjects’ characteristics in Experiment 1.
Variable Description n Mean SD Min Max
Forest group Member of a forest protection group (1= yes; 0=no) 173 0.34 – 0 1
Male Gender is male (1= yes, 0= no) 173 0.46 – 0 1
Income (USD) Average daily income in USD 172 1 0.78 0.09 4.39
Age Age in years 172 36.35 13.54 17 73
Years of education Years of formal education (e.g., nursery, schooling) 173 5.07 4.31 0 15
Children in household Number of children (15 years or younger) living in the household 172 1.66 1.32 0 6
Wealth index First principal component of principal component analysis on household assets (motorcycle, bicycle, gas stove, cell
phone, TV, fridge; proportion of variance explained= 0.345)
173 0 1 −0.98 2.6
Experience Has prepared soil bags before (1= yes; 0 = no) 170 0.23 – 0 1
Liked snacks “I like the food and drinks that were offered.” (1= agree; 0 = neutral; −1=disagree) 172 0.13 0.85 −1 1
Rate expectation Indicates whether the participant has stated an expected wage rate above (= 1) or below (= 0) the expected value
of the payment rate
172 0.65 – 0 1
Notes: Sample sizes vary slightly due to survey non-response. Details on the construction of the wealth index are provided in the supplementary material.
Fig. 4. Conservation effort (i.e., soil bags produced in the real-effort task) in
Experiment 1, comparison over treatments (i.e., payment designs; for ex-
planations, see Table 1). Each point is one observation (one subject). Horizontal
lines indicate means and standard errors.
Table 3
Models on conservation effort (i.e., soil bags produced in the real-effort task) in
the real-effort task (Experiment 1) under different treatments (i.e., payment
designs; for explanations, see Table 1). Fixed individual is the reference category.
Models include village fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Model 1 Model 2
Merit input 5.66 (2.30)** 5.25 (2.43)**
Merit output 4.32 (2.29)* 4.38 (2.37)*
Fixed equal 2.53 (2.32) 1.62 (2.42)
Forest group 0.14 (2.01)
Male −5.11 (1.87)***
Income (USD) −0.80 (1.27)
Age 0.08 (0.08)
Years of education 0.06 (0.25)
Children in household −0.39 (0.76)
Wealth index 0.22 (1.22)
Experience 0.63 (2.10)
Liked snacks 0.31 (1.04)
Rate expectation −2.33 (1.93)
Constant 32.39 (3.56)*** 34.32 (5.55)***
Village fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 173 166
Log Likelihood −658 −617
AIC 1,328 1,266
Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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results demonstrate considerable shared fairness perceptions among
people from the same community.7 Differences in ratings of payment
schemes between communities were small in magnitude (Supplemen-
tary material, Fig. S4) and statistically not significantly different from
each other (Kruskal-Wallis tests, all p > 0.4).8 Thus, given the rather
heterogeneous set of villages (e.g., regarding ethnicity or income, see
Supplementary material, Table S1), it is fair to say that these norms are
also shared across villages, at least at the regional scale of our study.
Overall, the merit input treatment was perceived as the most equi-
table (highest equity scores) across villages by far (median= 0.90,
mean=0.85), whereas the fixed individual treatment was ranked as the
least equitable (median=−0.02, mean=−0.07), with the others
ranked in between (Fig. 5). In six of the eight villages, the ranking of
equity scores was consistent with the ranking of the pooled data
(Supplementary material, Fig. S4). Equity scores differed significantly
by payment scheme (Kruskal-Wallis test, χ²= 21.3, df= 3,
p < 0.001). All paired comparisons reveal differences between equity
scores across payment schemes (Wilcoxon rank sum tests, all
p < 0.05), except for the comparison of merit input and fixed equal
(p= 0.49), as also apparent from Fig. 5. This implies that even within
the two merit-based (conditional) payment schemes and within the two
fixed (unconditional) payment schemes, there are large differences in
what is perceived as more “socially appropriate” and “consistent with
moral or fair behaviour.” Now, we turn to our primary aim, which was
to relate equity perceptions about particular policies on the community
level (Experiment 2) with individuals’ conservation behaviour under
the respective policy (Experiment 1).
4.3. Combined analysis of experiment 1 and 2: effectiveness and equity
Perceived fairness of payment schemes and conservation effort have
a positive association. First, looking at the aggregated results from the
previous subsections, the environmental effectiveness of treatments
(Fig. 4) and their perceived equity (Fig. 5) follow the same ranking
(although differences between payment schemes are larger in Experi-
ment 2). For example, the merit input treatment induces the highest
conservation effort in Experiment 1 and is also perceived as the most
equitable in Experiment 2.
In addition, we investigate the correlation on the level of the in-
dividual land user. From each individual’s performance, we subtract the
mean performance in his or her village to obtain an adjusted effort
value (i.e., mean-centering, a form of adjusting for village effects). The
correlation of adjusted conservation effort under a payment design and
the equity score of the respective payment design is positive (Pearson’s
r= 0.19, p=0.010), as shown in Fig. 6.9 Note that, to a large degree,
this correlation is driven by the high environmental effectiveness and
equity of differentiated payments conditional on input (merit input;
orange dots), as compared to differentiated unconditional payments
(fixed individual; blue dots). There is a negligible difference in effec-
tiveness between input- and output-based conditional payments
(Fig. 4), but a large difference in equity scores (Fig. 5). This indicates
that the empirical association we observe between equity and
effectiveness across payment schemes might be positive overall but
should not be generalized as being linear.
5. Discussion
In this study, we experimentally tested the environmental effec-
tiveness (motivation of conservation effort) and social equity (collec-
tively perceived fairness) of popular design features like payment dif-
ferentiation and payment conditionality in incentive-based
conservation policy. Outcomes were elicited in a real-effort task with
real environmental benefits and a coordination game, respectively.
Among 259 small-scale land users from North-Western Vietnam who
participated in the incentivized lab-in-the-field experiments, we found
that equity and effectiveness differed significantly across payment
schemes. In both outcome dimensions, merit-based payments which
were conditional on input, i.e. compensation for effort or costs were the
most preferable payment scheme. The effectiveness differences, how-
ever, were rather small. Thus, we found that payments which are built
on meritocratic principles (i.e., giving more to ecosystem service pro-
viders who – other things being equal – invest more time, money or
physical effort) do not necessarily trade off effectiveness against equity,
but can achieve both. Indeed, we found a weak positive correlation of
effectiveness and equity across all four payment schemes that were
employed in the experiments. In what follows, we discuss the results in
more detail, along their implications and limitations.
The effectiveness premium of conditional payments based on input
Fig. 5. Equity scores from the coordination game (Experiment 2). One equity
score on the village level was derived for all treatments (i.e., payment designs;
for explanations, see Table 1) in each village (n= 8). Each point is one ob-
servation (one village). Horizontal lines indicate medians.
Fig. 6. Scatter plot of equity score on the village level (Experiment 2) and
adjusted individual-level conservation effort (Experiment 1), aggregated over
treatments. Adjusted conservation effort is calculated as difference from the
village mean to control for the village effect. Line derived from linear regression
(for interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is
referred to the web version of this article).
7 Simulations show that, given our group sizes of ten and eleven in
Experiment 2, random responses would lead to roughly one half of subjects
matching their village’s modal response(s). The proportion we find is sub-
stantially higher (65.4%). The simulated value approaches 25% for larger group
sizes. We thank Carl Salk for pointing this out.
8 These numbers should be interpreted with caution, as the sample size for
this comparison is small (n = 8 at the village level) which implies a high risk of
a type II error (false negative).
9 The value is lower without adjustment (Pearson’s r = 0.14, p = 0.076). A
linear fixed-effect model yields similar results to our adjusted performance
correlation (β: 5.69± 2.17, p = 0.010). Yet, we decided to use correlation
coefficients here to emphasize that one cannot infer any causal relationships
from the combined data of both experiments.
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(compensation for effort or costs) was particularly large when they
were compared to unconditional payments that differentiated payments
between recipients (treatment fixed individual; p < 0.05). The gain was
slightly smaller (and missed statistical significance at p=0.14) when
they were compared to unconditional payments that were un-
differentiated (i.e., egalitarian payments; treatment fixed equal). Thus,
when focusing only on the effectiveness for motivating conservation
behavior, unconditional egalitarian payments might be broadly com-
parable to merit-based payments, at least for the effect sizes which we
were able to detect given the statistical power of the study. On the other
hand, unconditional payments which are not egalitarian (i.e., which
differentiate) appear clearly less effective than merit-based payments.
The latter case is potentially more common in real-life PES im-
plementations than intended by policy-makers: Cases where elite cap-
ture, gender inequality, corruption or opaque and complex benefit
distribution mechanisms exclude portions of the population from fi-
nancial transfers create payment differentiation without conditioning
on conservation effort. Our results suggest that such de facto arbitrary
modes of differentiation inhibit environmental effectiveness
(Experiment 1) and, further, are seen as most unfair and socially in-
appropriate (Experiment 2).
The results on the effectiveness of incentives for conservation effort
conditional on individual merit (Experiment 1) are broadly in line with
previous lab-in-the-field experiments where individual incentives
worked better than group incentives (Gatiso et al., 2018) and where
conditionality on a measure of change in ecosystem services provision
rather than absolute ecosystem services provision (reflecting more
control over the outcome by ecosystem services providers; Reutemann
et al., 2016) led to more forest-friendly behavior. Such payment dif-
ferentiation conditional on ecosystem services providers’ individual
costs is indeed seen as a desirable design feature of PES which, how-
ever, is globally not (yet) widely practiced (Engel, 2016; Wunder et al.,
2018), despite its apparent contribution to positive ecological outcomes
of PES (Ezzine-de-Blas et al., 2016).
The case our study makes for these payment design features be-
comes stronger when considering that input-based conditional pay-
ments were also perceived as more equitable than alternative payment
designs in the coordination games (Experiment 2). Given the, at least in
practice, rather unconditional (with respect to individual conservation
costs and efforts) and undifferentiated distribution of benefits in the
Vietnamese PFES program (Loft et al., 2017b), our results cast some
doubt on its long-term ecological and social sustainability. Not only are
the majority of the formally determined payment indicators (e.g., origin
of forest) only poor indicators of actual conservation effort and costs by
land users (see section 2), but often payments are distributed fully
undifferentiated due to practical limitations. Based on our results, we
can conclude that payment schemes without conditionality on in-
dividual conservation effort and with differentiation according to fac-
tors out of the control of local ecosystem services providers, are per-
ceived as socially inappropriate or unfair. Even when ignoring
consequences for effectiveness, this corroborates the conclusion that
current PFES legislation interferes with social norms of distributive
fairness. However, local actors, their social and cultural norms play an
important role in adapting and transforming PES institutions. Ignoring
their notions and excluding them from decision-making may reinforce
existing inequity (Van Hecken et al., 2015).
Importantly, our study ignores some obstacles for the implementa-
tion of well-differentiated, conditional payments like a lack of perfect
information on individual efforts and the high administrative costs that
would be associated with gathering such information (Engel, 2016).
Thus, one also must consider the efficiency of alternative PES schemes,
a dimension that our study does not explicitly address. Arguably, the
rather small gain in effectiveness by merit-based payments observed in
the real-effort task, i.e. 9% increase in conservation effort in merit-
based payments conditional on input vs. unconditional egalitarian
payments (Table 3) might not justify an implementation solely based on
effectiveness criteria. This is because costs must eventually be weighed
against benefits in policy-making. While conditional payments that
reward merit, and in particular those that purely reward effort, may
induce slightly higher conservation efforts, they could also imply higher
bureaucracy and monitoring costs. A resulting lack of transparent and
reliable monitoring, however, could in turn spur perceptions of un-
fairness, even under schemes that are intended to be conditional and
well-differentiated. It is an important empirical question to determine
how much external monitoring is necessary for an implementation of
payments that are differentiated according to conservation effort. In-
terestingly, Jindal et al. (2017) find that, in a sample of land users in
Northern Vietnam which is similar to ours, subjects “report truthfully”,
i.e., they collect the rewards they have earned in a real effort task but
not more, even though they could easily cheat without being detected.
The authors suggest that honesty norms and trust can enable self-
monitoring. Similarly, other lab-in-the-field experiments showed that,
even when strictly monitored PES is abandoned, land users might carry
on norms of pro-conservation behavior (Andersson et al., 2018).10
Thus, in some societies, mutual monitoring and internal benefit dis-
tribution could be a feasible alternative to external monitoring, low-
ering risks and costs for the implementation of differentiated and
conditional PES (Engel, 2016).
Note that sensitivity for monetary rewards was generally small in
our real-effort task (Fig. 4). The unconditional payments in two of our
treatments would have implied full rewards even in the absence of any
effort, but still they led to high conservation effort. This finding is in
line with a potentially important role of environmental motives and
intrinsic motivation in conservation effort (Rode et al., 2015). In the
survey after the experiment, 65% of participants stated that they were
motivated to exert effort in the task, because, amongst other things,
they wanted to support conservation. An experimental design which
does not produce real-world environmental public goods, such as
standard social dilemma games, could have missed this important
motive, arguably with reductions in external validity. The surprisingly
strong deviation from the “rational” prediction of no effort in un-
conditional payment schemes mirrors findings from other real-effort
experiments in behavioral economics under more controlled conditions
(Araujo et al., 2016; Eckartz, 2014). Explanations could be competi-
tiveness or conformity. It could also be that subjects want to please the
experimenters (Zizzo, 2010). Although subjects were successfully en-
couraged not to communicate verbally with each other in our setup,
they could in principle observe the performance of their neighbors,
which might induce peer pressure. A general curiosity for the task
which could have played a role, too. Increasing the available time for
the task may be one way to address this problem (Charness et al.,
2018).
In addition to the effects of payment design, we found a comparably
large and significant gender effect, with women exerting greater efforts.
The effect remains after controlling for experience with the task and
other potential confounders. Further, it is an individual-level effect: the
share of women in a village session is not correlated with performance
on the session level (Supplementary material). In our real effort task,
the packing of soil bags is regarded as a tedious and repetitive activity,
often conducted by women in Vietnamese nurseries and forest en-
terprises (VAN 2015). In many parts of Vietnam, soil bag packing for
afforestation is also considered a poverty reduction strategy to enhance
gender equality by supporting young women (Nghe An Provincial Party
Committee 2016). Moreover, due to social and gender norms, packing
soil bags might be seen as rather suitable for women. Thus, on the one
hand, the effect could be interpreted as reflecting that our task is cul-
turally rendered as rather “female.” On the other hand, it gives
10 Although abandoning PES is different from abandoning external mon-
itoring, both require community norms to replace an external authority – a
leviathan.
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additional confidence for the conjecture that increasing women parti-
cipation in forest management and conservation, e.g. in afforestation-
related activities, will be beneficial in terms not only of gender equality,
but also environmental effectiveness (Cook et al., 2019). Other PFES
studies in Vietnam (Haas et al., 2019; Pham et al., 2018) found that
there is inequality in PFES participation, as only strong and young male
villagers are selected for forest patrolling groups, and therefore these
men are the main PFES beneficiaries. Our findings call for a gender-
sensitive approach in PFES management where roles of both, women
and men, are recognized and payment distributions are developed
based on these gender role differences. Many development interven-
tions like microfinance or conditional cash transfers already target
women as the primary agents of change (Duflo, 2012; Ma et al., 2017).
In conclusion, we showed that equity and effectiveness of PES de-
signs are affected by the differentiation and conditionality of payments
and that equitable PES designs can coincide with effective PES designs.
There is a tendency that both are maximized when individuals receive
differentiated payments which are conditional on costs of and effort for
ES provision, although, regarding effectiveness, effect estimates are
small and noisy. Wunder et al. (2018, p. 149) state that “navigating
efficiency and equity trade-offs in the face of contextual fairness prin-
ciples can lead to some hard choices for PES design.” Our study, how-
ever, offers the promising conclusion that this might not always be the
case. One of the big advantages of our experimental set-up is that we
can separately measure effectiveness and equity in the same population
at the same time and based on the same type of conservation inter-
vention (paying individuals for filling soil bags for afforestation).
However, we are not able to make claims about causal links between
equity and effectiveness. While our results are consistent with the view
that there is an “instrumental value” of equity for the effectiveness of
conservation policies (Law et al., 2018), the research design does not
allow a causal attribution of any differences in effort to perceived
fairness of the payment scheme. This is an important question for future
research and we think that the experimental paradigm presented here
could help to further investigate this, because it constitutes a middle-
ground between large-scale experimentation with actual policy inter-
ventions (e.g., Randomized Control Trials, Jayachandran et al., 2017)
and abstract lab-in the-field experiments based merely on social di-
lemma games. Arguably, shortcomings of the presented design in its
current form are that many potential confounders, e.g., peer pressure
due to observability of effort and the uncertainty about its general-
izability to other contexts and behaviors, such as patrolling in the forest
remain. Note that we also have only looked at aspects of distributional
equity, although equity is a multidimensional concept (Myers et al.,
2018) and can be defined along different dimensions in PES (Brown and
Corbera, 2003; Corbera et al., 2007; Friedman et al., 2018; Martin et al.,
2014a, 2014b; McDermott et al., 2013; Pascual et al., 2010, 2014).
Contextual and procedural equity, as well as recognition, might be
equally important (Pascual et al., 2014). Future experiments could also
investigate effort under the premise that people can self-select into
different payment schemes vs. an exogenous subscription (Rommel,
2015). This would allow us to estimate the impact of “letting the people
have a say in how they want to be paid” on effort. Thus, our novel
experimental designs offers a number of interesting routes to further
investigate in how far exactly in conservation policies “equity and ef-
ficiency are fundamentally codependent” (Law et al., 2018, p. 300).
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